Societe Generale's 'Mission Green',  the report on its findings in the investigation of trader Jerome Kerviel's activites and the wider framework of management and technology that (inadvertently) faciliatated them, is rather dull. Charts and graphs aplenty follow a 9- page analysis of what went wrong, going so far as to list each relevant day in diary order of Kerviel's fradulent trading actions, from New Year's Eve 2007 to Wednesday 18 January, and a run down of what happened, to the second. Traders are re-badged 'agents' - Kerviel is re-branded 'JK' - but it's not exactly a James Bond/Dr. Evil- style thriller we've got here.

What the report basically seems to conclude is that SocGen's middle management, those supposed to regulate their traders, ensure they stuck to trading limits, identify any dodgyness early on, and use their intelligence to keep things runing smoothly, couldn't be arsed. That meant, perhaps, that someone who was switched on enough to see this laissez-faire attitude simply capitalised on it, knowing that he wouldn't get caught because no one was bothering to look up the basic warning signs, or act on the ones their eyes did happen to meet with. Those employed to respond to big, flashing red lights (Eurex contacting the bank to flag up odd-looking trades coming from around Kerviel's patch, in-house trading systems automatically generating reports highlighting someone in Kerviel's general direction had been busting their trading account limits without authorisation, that sort of thing) didn't do, or didn't move in time, or strongly enough. Indeed, the report says that "supervision of JK appears to have been weak" despite several alerts to front-office about the trader on grounds of vigilance "or for investigation" and adds that desk management didn't identify initial fraudulent trades or their concealment, and tolerated JK's taking of various intraday directional positions that had nothing to do with his mandate there. (Maybe this last point is common in the trading world where making as much as as possible means rule-bending, within limits, is ok).

Obviously, the middle managers around JK had lapsed - but again, SocGen says it can't question JK's then-manager because he doesn't work there anymore. Kerviel was able to move under the radar because when his higher-ups were busy not monitoring him properly or bothering to take action when he was found to have exceeded trading limits, they were preoccupied with finding people to replace staff that had left the bank - such as the person who was responsible for a critical front-office function whose work went uncovered for ten weeks from January 2007.

One manager under whose remit Kerviel fell failed to carry out detailed analysis of his trader's earnings or their positions (all automated) as he was supposed to do. It was a case of clicking a few buttons. Now SocGen thinks Kerviel may have had an accomplice in his trading assistant, who was "dedicated to JK's activity" and registered 15% of Kerviel's trades.

Pre-report, initial speculation across financial newsrooms of Kerviel's motives led to good old capitalist greed. Some thought he just wanted to be seen to be the best, a star trader. Others put it down to a reaction to family troubles or just being a bit of a weirdo: always the quiet ones. But it was such a simple rouse for a man in his position, I doubt Kerviel even needed much of an underlying motivation like wanting more cash, needing more glory, an Oedipus complex, and so on. I''d wager he was just using that nose for opportunity that he was probably hired for. A door was open - he walked through it.

The post-mortem shows that the bank had all the info there, but sadly needed a big kick in the derriere to be pushed into collating it, and into paying attention. 20/20 hindsight is a brilliant invention for the remorseful. It's incredible that an organisation of SocGen's size can marshal its resources to publish something this detailed 16 weeks after fraud was publicly announced, but was unable to organise itself to this effect on a daily basis, something that may have prevented the Kerviel affair from happening.

Of course, from here on in SocGen must show that it has a plan to make all the identified problems better, and then show that it is enacting that plan, and then that the plans is working, and that another Kerviel cannot happen. Avarice is expected of banks and their traders. But in their world, slothfulness really is a deadly sin.

See the report here http://www.sp.socgen.com/sdp/sdp.nsf/V3ID/8D7F118212725EC6C1257452005AA90E/$file/report%20part%203.pdf